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1 Introduction
As economies grow, so do the generation of wastes. In order to achieve
sustainable growth, recycling is promoted around the world. In a global-
ized world, not only the commodity trade but also international trade in
recyclable materials has increased significantly. Indeed, the world trade
volume of recyclable aluminum, lead zinc, copper and paper combined
increased from 2.5 million tons in 1970 to 21.5 million tons in 1997.１）
Such rapid growth of trade in recyclable materials exceeded the speed of
growth in primary resources.
Expansion of trade in recyclable material was in part due to the rising
prices of raw materials. The demand for recyclable materials increased to
substitute for the more expensive raw materials. However, the major trade
flow of recyclable materials is quite distinct from the trade patterns of
primary resources. Recyclable materials are mainly traded from the devel-
oped countries to the developing countries. The North-South trade of
recyclable materials is to meet the expanding resource demand in develop-
ing countries on one hand, and to alleviate the cost of waste treatment and
landfills in the developed countries, on the other hand.
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１） See Van Beukering (2001). The trade to output ratio for the recycled copper,
paper and aluminum nearly tripled in the same period.
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As the significance of international trade in recyclable materials
increased, discussions on trade policies emerged. One concerns with the
effects of environmental damage associated with the recycling operations
in the importing countries. In the 1980’s, exports of recyclable materials
from the US and EU to developing countries contained hazardous wastes
and created serious concerns for the environmental damages in developing
countries. The so-called pollution dumping lead to the enactment of the
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (the Basel Convention in short) in 1992,
and resulted in prohibiting transboundary movements of unrecoverable
wastes and hazardous recyclable wastes.
Another trade policy discussion relates to the exporting countries.
Rapid expansion of trade in recyclable materials also created concerns in
the exporting countries, for it puts strains on the domestic recycling system
by pulling necessary inputs of recyclable materials away from the domes-
tic recycling system.
The recycling system in Japan, as originally designed by the Basic
Law for Promoting the Creation of a Recycling-oriented Society, was to
establish a domestic or closed recycling system. It was over the last two
decades that Japan experienced a very rapid increase in exports of recycla-
ble materials mainly to China. For example, exports of plastic wastes in
2009 increased by 36 times in weight tones compared to the year 1990,
and scrap iron and copper increased by 24 times and 30 times respec-
tively.２）Rising prices and exports consequently lead to the consideration
of protecting the domestic recycling system through the use of trade
２） See Satake and Saito (2010) and Kojima (2005) for Japan’s recent trade pat-
terns of recyclable materials.
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policies such as export taxes or non-tariff measures. Japan, in fact,
amended the recycling law to discourage exports of used plastic bottles.３）
Effects on importing countries and exporting countries both lead to
policy discussions of adopting restrictive trade policies on recyclable
material trade. However, there is little theoretical understanding regarding
the effects of trade policies on recyclable materials. Although there are a
sizable number of studies on recycling policies and waste management
policies in a closed economy framework, there are only a few papers that
study trade in recyclable materials. One of the first papers to analyze trade
in recyclable materials is Grace et al. (1978). More recently, Van Beuker-
ing (2001) and Van Beukering et al. (2006) formalize the international
material product chain to investigate the optimal recycling policies.
Higashida and Managi (2008) attempts to explain the trade patterns of
recyclable materials among developing countries both theoretically and
empirically by using a gravity model. Effects of exporting recyclable
materials are studied in Satake et al. (2010).
However, there are even fewer papers that provide some basic under-
standing of the effects of trade policies, which is crucial for the designing
the actual trade policies for recyclable materials. This paper is one of the
first attempts to analyze the effects of trade policies on recyclable materi-
als. In particular, we examine the effect of export taxes on recyclable
materials on final good production by constructing a simple general
equilibrium model of a small open economy. The recyclable material is to
be characterized as traded intermediate goods, which are produced by
３） In the Japanese recycling law for containers and packaging, “smooth delivery
of waste plastic bottles for sound recycling” is encouraged. Local municipalities
are expected to transfer used plastic bottles to the domestic recyclers and not to
the exporters.
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using consumption wastes.
This paper can also be seen as an extension of effective protection
literature analyzing the effects of trade policies on traded intermediate
goods. Findlay (1987) showed that export taxes on raw materials, which
are used as inputs for the production of a final good, do provide effective
protection on final good production. Our model will provide some insights
on whether the export taxes on recyclable materials generate effective pro-
tection on final goods as well. An optimal export policy on the recyclable
materials is also going to be analyzed in this paper.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and lays out the basic properties of an economy. Section 3 analyzes
the effects of an export tax on the recyclable material on domestic outputs
of the final goods and the recyclable material. In Section 4, the optimal
export tax on recyclable material is derived. We conclude the paper with
some remarks in Section 5.
2 A Model
The economy consists of two sectors producing a recyclable material, R ,
and a final product F , which uses R as an input. The production function
for the final good is
XF  FF (LF RF ) (1)
where LF and RF are the inputs of labor and a recyclable material used in
the production of the final good. FF is assumed to exhibit constant returns
to scale and diminishing returns to each factor.
The production function for the recyclable material is
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R  FR (LR ZR ) (2)
where LR denotes labor and ZR is a used final good engaged in the pro-
duction of recyclable material.４）FR is assumed to exhibit constant returns
to scale and diminishing returns to labor and used final good.
Through consumption of the final good, recycling wastes ZF are
generated. They are to be reused in the production of the final good. Let
CF denote the consumption of the final good.５）
ZF  CF  (3)
where is the recycling rate; 01.６） It should be noted that post
consumption wastes are generated by consuming both the domestically
produced final goods and imports.
LF LR  L (4)
RF RE  R (5)
ZF  ZR (6)
where L is the amount of labor supply and RE is the export of the recy-
clable material
The final good F is the only consumption good in the economy and
is assumed to be imported from the rest of the world. In exchange for RE ,
４） For example, used PET bottles are used as inputs to produce recyclable prod-
ucts such as plastic flakes or pellets.
５） The consumer’s problem of choosing between garbage disposal and recycling is
discussed, say, in Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995). They consider more general
form of “technologies” of household consumption.
６） Non-recycled wastes are assumed to be disposed of at no cost. Environmental
costs associated with non-recycled wastes are beyond our scope of the paper.
―
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imports are obtained in the form of the final good. The trade balance
equation is then given as follows.
PF CF  PF XF PR RE (7)
where Pi is the international price of commodity i. Since the economy is
assumed to be a small open economy, PF and PR are determined exoge-
nously.
Assuming producers act competitively, the marginal productivity
pricing conditions hold.  PF FFL F  PR FRL R (8)
PR  PF FFRF (9)
PZ  PR FRZR (10)
We can now write down the unit-cost equations as follows.
aFL aFR PR  PF (11)
aRL aRZ PZ  PR (12)
where aij is the input requirement of factor j for the production of com-
modity i . It should be noted that the international prices of the final good
and the recyclable material, PF and PR , solely determine wage  and the
price of recycling wastes PZ . It is assumed that consumers own the recy-
cling wastes; consumers earn factor rewards PZ from the recycling
sector.７）
７） If local governments are responsible for collecting garbage, the property rights
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Upon totally differentiating the unit-cost equations, we obtain FL ０ ˆ PˆF   FR PˆR       (13) RL  RZ PˆZ PˆR
The hat notation indicates the rate of change in that variable such thatˆd, and  ij is the factor payment share of j in commodity i.
Solutions of the price system give us the following.ˆ 1 FL (PˆF   FR PˆR ) (14)
PˆZ  1 FL RZ (  RL PˆF  RL FR PˆR  FL PˆR ) (15)
The structure of the model is reminiscent of a specific factor model in
trade theory. An increase in the international price of the final good
increases while decreases PZ . The directions of the change in the inter-
national price of the recyclable material are reversed; an increase in PR
decreases while increases PZ .
We now turn to the resource constraints for labor and the recyclable
material:
aFL XF aRL R L (16)
aFR XF RF (17)
aRZ R ZR CF (18)
on wastes are transferred to local governments once garbage is disposed. Local
governments earn revenue by selling recycling garbage to the recycling sector.
See Satake et al (2010) for detailed description of the recycling system for used
plastic bottles in Japan. During some period, the price of recycling garbage
took negative values, meaning local governments paid the recycling sector for
the garbage to be processed.
―
Export Taxes on Recyclable Materials
― ―１７７
By substituting (7) and totally differentiating,       (19) iL is labor employment share in commodity i,  ER  RER is the share of
exports in recyclable material, iL is the elasticity of the factor substitution
in sector i, such that FL  aˆ FLaˆ FRˆPˆF , RL  aˆ RLaˆ RZˆPˆR , and i  Pi XiPF CF is
the GDP share of sector i.
By solving the system,        (20)
where D  R  ER is the determinant of the 33 matrix and is
clearly D 0.８）By using (14) and (15)
B1  L ( FLFRFL FL  RL 1FLRL )(PˆF PˆR )
B2   FRFLFL (ˆPˆF )  FRFL (PˆF PˆR )
B3  RLRL (ˆPˆR )R PˆF R PˆR ˆ RL RLFLRZ (PˆF PˆR )R (PˆF PˆR )ˆ
It is straightforward to obtain
８） We have used the fact that R   PR RPF CF  ER .
 FL FRF  RL11 ０ ERR XˆFRˆRˆE L (FL LR )ˆLF PˆF LR PˆR FRFLFL (ˆPˆF )RLRL (ˆPˆR )R PˆF R PˆR ˆ
―ˆ
XˆF
Rˆ
RˆE
1
D
R  ERR  ERR  ER  RLR FLR1 RLR  RL ER FL ER1 RL ER B1B2B3
―ˆ
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XˆF  RˆE   1D (B2  B3 ) 1
D
[( FRFL  RLFLRZRL R )(PˆF  PˆR )ˆ] (21)
The term XˆF  RˆE
PˆF  PˆR indicates that the “production possibility frontier” between
the final good and the exports of recyclable material is concave around
the equilibrium; The final good to the recyclable material export ratio
increases as the relative price of the final good increases. Conversely, as
the relative price of recyclable materials increases, the exports of recycla-
ble materials increase relatively more than the increase in the production
of the final good.
Equation (21) also reveals the role of recycling policy variable, , in
determining the comparative advantage. As increases, XFRE ratio decreases.
A country with higher recycling rate has a comparative advantage in
recyclable materials, while a country with lower rate has a comparative
advantage in the final good. Recycling policy can be an instrument in
altering the comparative advantage.
3 An Export Tax on the Recyclable Material
3.1 Effects of an Export Tax
In this subsection, we are going to analyze the effects of export taxes on
the recyclable materials. In order to distinguish the domestic price and the
international price, we introduce the * notation to indicate the interna-
tional price. Let PR be the international price of recyclable material and
PR be the domestic price of the recyclable material. Suppose an export tax
on the recyclable materials is imposed at a rate t such that PR(1t )PR ,
and the final good is traded freely; PFPF .９）
Export Taxes on Recyclable Materials
― ―１７９
An increase in an export tax reduces the domestic price of the recy-
clabie material. In order to examine the effects of an export tax on the
recyclable material, we first analyze the comparative statics of output
changes with respect to the changes in PR . From (20) and by substituting
(14) and (15), we obtain
XˆF
PˆR
  1
D
(( R ER )B1R RL R B2R RLER B3R ) (22)
Rˆ
PˆR
  1
D
(( R ER )B1R FL R B2R FLER B3R ) (23)
RˆE
PˆR
  1
D
(( R ER )B1R (1RL R )B2R (1RLER )B3R )
(24)
where
B1
R  (FLFRFL FL RL 1FLRL )0
B2
R  FRFL 0
B3
R  ( RLFLRZRL BR )0
Clearly, the supply response of the final good is positive with respect
to an increase in an export tax (or a reduction in PR ). The output level of
the final good expands as an export tax on the recyclable material in-
creases. The domestic production of the final good is thus protected by
the export tax on the recyclable material.
The effects on the recyclable material sector, on the other hand, is
less clearcut. If export share of the recyclable material is sufficiently
large,１０） imposing an export tariff on the recyclable material reduces the
９） Suppose dPF dPR 0and dL 0, then (1t )dPR PR dt  dPR 0, or
by using the hat notations, tˆ  PˆR where tˆ   dt1t .―ˆ
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output level of the recyclable material and its exports; Rˆtˆ   RˆPˆ R  0 and
Rˆ E
tˆ
 Rˆ E
Pˆ R
 0. An export tax on the raw material will decrease the do-
mestic price of the raw material and reduces the output and the export
level of the raw material.
3.2 An Optimal Export Tax on Recyclable Materials
In this subsection, we proceed to analyze the welfare effects of an export
tax on the recyclable material based on the social welfare function U (CF ).
Let g (PFu ; PR ) be the minimum expenditure required to attain the wel-
fare level u at given prices PF and PR . When export taxes are imposed,
we can write the national income-expenditure identity as follows:
g (PFu ; PR ) PF XF (1t )PR RE tPR RE (25) PF FF (LFFR (LRZR )RE )(1t )PR RE tPR RE
The minimum expenditure function is assumed to be equipped with the
following properties: i) positively homogeneous of degree one in PF , ii)
concave in PF , and iii) gPF  CF .
By differentiating (25) with respect to t,
g0
du
dt
 PF dXFdt (1t )PR dREdt tPR dREdt (26) (1t )PR FRZ ZRt tPR REt  PZ ZRt tPR REt
The optimal export tax on the recyclable material, t*, can be derived by
setting g0 dudt  0. The optimal tax rate can now be expressed as;
１０） R
ˆ
Pˆ R
0 if R (1FL )ER , and Rˆ E
Pˆ R
0 if 1R ER (1RL ).
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t PZ  ZR t
PR
 RE t RZER ZˆR tˆRˆE tˆ (27)
It is easy to see that t 0, if ZˆR
tˆ
0. This corresponds to the case
where the intermediate good is a raw material produced with natural
resources supplied in fixed amount. The optimal export tax is positive if
the signs of ZˆR tˆ and RˆE tˆ are opposite, and negative if otherwise.
In order to evaluate the optimal export tax rate, we need to determine
the changes in ZR . By using ZˆR aˆRZ Rˆ and (23), we can write down
the following.
Zˆ R
tˆ
( RLFLRERL ) 1D ((R ER )B1R FLR B2R FLER B3R ) (28)
Further calculation indicates that Zˆ R
tˆ
0 if the GDP share of the recycling
sector is sufficiently large, RERFL  RLFLRZRL D , so that the output ef-
fect of Zˆ R exceeds the substitution effect of aˆ RZ . Recall that from (24),
we know that RˆE
tˆ
0, Therefore, we know that the optimal export tax rate
on the recyclable material is negative, t 0, meaning that it is optimal to
subsidize exports of the recyclable material. By subsidizing exports of the
recyclable material, exports expand and hence the income increases. Wel-
fare as reflected by the consumption of the final good, then, increases.
Subsidizing exports of the recyclable material also has positive impact on
the production of recyclable materials, for an increased consumption cre-
ates more wastes which turn into recyclable materials. As a result of an
export subsidy, a productive factor, ZR , is generated and increases income.
In a related literature on trade policy on resource trade, Findlay (1987)
showed that the optimal export tax on the raw material is positive when
the raw material is monopolistically traded. It is through the monopolistic
power that taxing at a rate equal to the elasticity of foreign demand for
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the raw material that equalizes domestic marginal cost of raw material ex-
port with the marginal revenue, and attains the maximum utility. However,
in the absence of monopoly, the optimal trade policy is free trade. Sup-
pose instead that the final good is produced by using raw materials which
is in fixed supply, such that ZˆR  0 in (28). The optimal export tax rate
for the raw material is going to be zero. In case of the recyclable material,
it is optimal to subsidize exports even in the absence of monopoly. Raw
materials and recyclable materials are often seen as close substitutes for
production of final goods, however, the roles of trade policies on them are
quite distinct.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyzed the effects of an export tax on the recyclable
material in a simple model of a small open economy by formalizing the
recyclable material as a traded intermediate good, which is produced by
using consumption. The recyclable materials are substitutes for the raw
materials, yet, at the same time, they are wastes. The effects of an export
tax on the recyclable material are very much like that of the raw material,
such that it can protect domestic production of the final good. Whereas,
the effects of an export tax on the recyclable material differs from the one
on the raw material because it is produced by using consumption wastes.
There exists an optimal export tax on the recyclable material, which is
negative, even in the absence of neither monopoly nor environmental
effects. If an intermediate good is a raw material, the optimal export tax is
zero in such cases. It is worth noting that even without waste collection
and treatment costs, it was shown to be optimal to subsidize exports of
recyclable materials.
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To conclude the paper, a few disclaimers are in order. In our very
simplified model, the costs of collecting and dumping wastes were
assumed away. By introducing such costs, determination of the recycling
rate,  , now becomes a decision problem.１１）As we have shown in the
paper,  plays an important role in determining the trade patterns of recy-
clable materials. Endogenously determined   is considered in Van
Beukering et al. (2006); they showed that countries (developed countries)
with high charges on waste disposal achieve high recycling rates, and
hence result in exporting the recyclable materials.
Environmental costs associated with dumping and recycling are
another aspect which was beyond the scope of our analysis, but certainly
worth examining, since environmental concerns are one of the major rea-
soning behind the use of trade policies on recyclable materials. Different
environmental standards lead to different interpretations on the definition
of “hazardous wastes” whose trade is prohibited by the Basel Convention,
and hence to disputes over trade policies among developed and devel-
oping countries. Once wastes are transformed into resouces, we found that
providing export subsidies on recyclable materials is optimal even in the
abseuse of environmental costs. Of course, any policy design should not
be based on a small number of studies, but our analysis does raise some
questions regarding the optimality of export taxes. More studies on the
issue, that include collection costs and the environmental effects, are
certainly called for.
１１） See, for example, Palmer and Walls (1997) for the analysis in the context of a
closed economy.
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